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OPINION OF THE COURT 
    
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
In United States v. Perez, 5 F.4th 390 (3d Cir. 2021), we 
considered whether spatial proximity between firearms and 




under the Sentencing Guidelines.1  This case presents the 
inverse issue: whether spatial proximity of guns to drugs is 
necessary to establish such a connection under another 
Guideline provision, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1).2  We have 
already concluded that it is not.  United States v. Drozdowski, 
313 F.3d 819, 823 (3d Cir. 2002).  Although the connection in 
this case is so tenuous as to place it on the outer edge of the 
sentencing enhancement, defendant Fosque Kinte Denmark 
has not carried his burden of proving that the connection was 
clearly improbable, which is the test we apply.  We thus affirm 
the District Court’s application of the enhancement.   
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
In July 2018, Pennsylvania police intercepted a 
suspicious package that had been shipped from California to 
York, Pennsylvania.  The package contained five pounds of 
methamphetamine.  Police later determined that Denmark 
shipped the package.   
 
In December 2018, law enforcement recorded a 
FaceTime call with Denmark.  During the call, Denmark 
confirmed his involvement with the July 2018 shipment.  The 
caller ordered an additional three pounds of meth from 
 
1 The provision there was U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), which 
requires a four-level sentencing enhancement where a 
defendant “used or possessed any firearm . . . in connection 
with another felony offense.”   
 
2 We use “guns,” “firearms,” and “weapons” interchangeably 
here, though this Guideline applies to all “dangerous 




Denmark, who was to ship the drugs to York.  When the 
package arrived in York, he confirmed its delivery via phone.  
The meth in the package was in a “heat-sealed bag” wrapped 
in several layers of shrink wrap.  App. at 60, Hr’g Tr. 27:6–19. 
 
In January 2019, police carried out a search warrant for 
Denmark’s residence.  They confirmed that Denmark had 
conducted the December 2018 call in that location, as the 
residence matched his background during the call.  Police did 
not recover any drugs, but they did find stashes of firearms and 
drug paraphernalia in various parts of the house: a semi-
automatic assault rifle and shotgun, both unloaded (found 
under a bed in a second-story bedroom); two handguns, one 
loaded and one unloaded (found in a safe in the second-story 
bedroom’s closet); a heat-sealed plastic bag, an empty box that 
had contained more heat-sealed bags, and shrink wrap 
matching the packaging on the meth shipments (found in duffel 
bags in a first-story closet and the garage); a gun scope (also 
found in a duffel bag on the first floor); and a bullet-proof vest 
(found in a container in the garage). 
 
Law enforcement also found several loaded and 
unloaded magazines for the handguns and the assault rifle 
(including three high-capacity magazines) and over 900 rounds 
of ammunition (including 835 loose rounds and 74 rounds 
loaded in magazines).3  Some of these items were in the 
bedroom where the guns were located.   
 
 
3 At sentencing the Government asserted the stash also 
included armor-piercing rounds, but it later conceded this was 
incorrect.  The ammunition did, however, include flammable 




The grand jury indicted Denmark on two counts of 
distribution and possession with intent to distribute at least 500 
grams of meth, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 
(b)(1)(A)(viii).  Count 1 concerned the July 2018 shipment and 
Count 2 the December 2018 shipment.  Denmark pled guilty to 
Count 2 in exchange for the dismissal of Count 1 and a three-
level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. 
 
At sentencing Probation calculated Denmark’s offense 
level as 35, which gave a Guidelines imprisonment range of 
168 to 210 months and a mandatory minimum of ten years.  
The calculation included a two-level enhancement for 
possession of a dangerous weapon under U.S.S.G. 
§ 2D1.1(b)(1).  Defense counsel objected to the weapons 
enhancement, arguing that the firearms could not have been 
connected with Denmark’s offense of conviction because the 
meth had never been at his residence.  Counsel asserted that 
Denmark was the middleman between the meth supplier and 
the purchaser and that he merely took the package to the post 
office.  Counsel acknowledged that law enforcement had 
recovered drug paraphernalia at Denmark’s home but asserted 
that he had only used the paraphernalia for his marijuana-
dealing business. 
 
The District Court rejected this argument, ruling that 
“there has been sufficient evidence by the [G]overnment to 
support the possession of firearms . . . .”  App. at 68, Hr’g Tr. 
58:18–20.  The Court thus applied the two-level enhancement, 
leaving Denmark’s Guidelines range at 168 to 210 months.  
The Court varied downward, however, based in part on his 
previous charitable service and family responsibilities.  It 




a year and a quarter over the ten-year mandatory minimum.  He 
now appeals to us. 
 
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over 
Denmark’s prosecution for federal crimes under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  We have appellate jurisdiction over the District 
Court’s final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We also have 
jurisdiction in sentencing appeals under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  
  
In this context, “[w]e review a district court’s factual 
determinations for clear error” and reverse only if, “when 
reviewing the entire record, we are left with the definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”  United 
States v. Napolitan, 762 F.3d 297, 307 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  But we exercise plenary review 
over a district court’s interpretation of the Guidelines.  Id.  
 
Here the parties do not dispute most of the facts; they 
disagree primarily as to what the Guidelines standard requires.  
We thus conduct a fresh review of the District Court’s legal 
interpretation.  However, we have said that a court’s decision 
to apply the enhancement for weapons is “essentially factual,” 
meriting only clear-error review.  Drozdowski, 313 F.3d at 822.  
This is because whether the defendant has disproven a 
connection between his weapons and his offense is a “fact-
bound determination.”  Napolitan, 762 F.3d at 308 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Hence we review for clear error the 
District Court’s determination concerning the connection, or 
lack of it, between guns and drugs. 
 




III.  ANALYSIS 
 
Denmark argues that, for the weapons enhancement to 
apply, the guns had to be “actually ‘present’ at the crime,” 
Denmark’s Br. at 8, meaning they had to be physically near 
him while he transported the meth to the post office.  We are 
unpersuaded. 
 
Besides the drug paraphernalia on the first floor, the 
Government does not have any evidence that Denmark ever 
had meth in his home.  Moreover, the paraphernalia and the 
guns were found in different rooms and on different floors.  
Denmark essentially argues that these facts resolve the case.  
Our threshold inquiry, then, is whether a firearm must be 
physically close to drugs or drug paraphernalia for the 
enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) to apply.  The answer 
is no. 
 
Section 2D1.1(b)(1) provides that, in a conviction for 
unlawful manufacturing, importing, exporting, or trafficking 
of drugs, “[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was 
possessed, increase [the offense level] by 2 levels.”  
Application Note 11(A) to this provision provides: 
 
The enhancement for weapon possession in 
subsection (b)(1) reflects the increased danger of 
violence when drug traffickers possess weapons.  
The enhancement should be applied if the 
weapon was present, unless it is clearly 
improbable that the weapon was connected with 
the offense.  For example, the enhancement 




the defendant’s residence, had an unloaded 
hunting rifle in the closet. 
 
U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) cmt. n.11(A) 
(U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2018). 
   
We explained the mechanics of this analysis in United 
States v. Napolitan, where we observed that the Government 
must first prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, “only that 
the defendant possessed a dangerous weapon.”  762 F.3d at 309 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The burden of production 
then shifts to the defendant to “demonstrate that the connection 
between the weapon and the drug offense was clearly 
improbable.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Under 
this approach, then, the Government does not have to prove 
any relationship between the weapons and the drugs.  Rather, 
the “general rule” is that “the enhancement should be applied 
if a firearm was present.”  Id.  It is the defendant’s burden to 
show the lack of a connection.  Id. 
 
Denmark argues that “the record must show ‘that a 
temporal and spatial relation existed between the weapon, the 
drug[-]trafficking activity, and the defendant.’”  Denmark’s 
Br. at 6 (quoting Napolitan, 762 F.3d at 309).  Napolitan, as 
noted, instructs otherwise; the Government “must show only 
that the defendant possessed a dangerous weapon,” 762 F.3d at 
309 (internal quotation marks omitted), and it “can” make that 
showing “by establishing ‘that a temporal and spatial relation 
existed between the weapon, the drug trafficking activity, and 
the defendant,’” id. (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 621 F.3d 
390, 396 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)).  The use of “can” 
provides a path to proving possession, but it is not the only one.  




spatial relation”—or any relation at all—between the firearms 
and the drugs to carry its initial burden.  See id.   
 
We are mindful that Napolitan seems to require 
physical proximity to drugs or paraphernalia, as we stated there 
that the enhancement applies “even where there were no drugs 
in the house, provided the gun was found near other indicia of 
drug activity.”  762 F.3d at 310 (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  But the “indicia of drug activity” 
language, we think, is a mere proxy for what the Commentary 
to the Guideline requires: a connection (which we understand 
to exist once the Government proves the defendant possessed 
a firearm) between the guns and the drug-trafficking offense.  
See U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) cmt. 
n.11(A).  Here, law enforcement observed Denmark make a 
drug deal over FaceTime from his home.  Thus we do not need 
to rely on “indicia” of drug activity found at the home because 
officers observed actual drug activity there. 
  
Moreover, as we discuss next, physical proximity 
between drugs (or paraphernalia) and guns is only one of four 
factors we must consider in making the “clearly improbable” 
determination.  We have never considered the physical-
proximity factor to be dispositive as a matter of law, and we 
decline to do so here.  We note, however, that the absence of 
physical proximity between guns and drugs or paraphernalia 
might be dispositive in some cases.  For example, if a 
defendant kept guns in a storage unit and conducted drug deals 
at a house in a different city, the defendant might be able to 
demonstrate that the connection was clearly improbable based 
on the guns’ location alone.  In that circumstance, the guns 
might be “truly inaccessible” to the defendant during the drug-




reject only the narrow position that § 2D1.1(b)(1) can never 
apply unless the guns are physically near drugs or 
paraphernalia.  And this case illustrates why: Although 
Denmark may never have possessed meth at his residence, 
police watched him agree to sell the meth via FaceTime in the 
same home where the guns were found a month later.  That 
alone makes it difficult for him to show that the guns were not 
connected with his drug offense. 
 
Denmark also contends that the enhancement in 
§ 2D1.1(b)(1) applies only when the weapons were “present at 
the crime.”  Denmark’s Br. at 7 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  According to him, the guns could not have been 
present at the crime because the drug delivery occurred through 
the mail, away from his home.  Note 11(A), however, does not 
require that the weapons be “present at the crime”; it requires 
only that the weapons be “present.”  U.S. Sent’g Guidelines 
Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) cmt. n.11(A); see also Napolitan, 762 
F.3d at 309.  And Napolitan instructs that, to make a prima 
facie showing, “the [G]overnment must show only that the 
defendant possessed a dangerous weapon” without regard to 
where that weapon was located at the time of the crime.  762 
F.3d at 309 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 
Denmark concedes, consistent with the Government’s 
evidence, that he possessed the guns found at his residence.  So 
his argument—that the enhancement cannot apply because his 
guns were not close to drugs or paraphernalia—fails.  The 
burden now falls on him to demonstrate that the connection 
between his weapons and the drug offense is clearly 




that “defendants have rarely been able to overcome the ‘clearly 
improbable’ hurdle”).   
 
In this case, a clearly improbable finding between 
firearms and drug activity is not a hurdle for Denmark but a 
wall.  Though the District Court held an evidentiary hearing on 
whether the enhancement in § 2D1.1(b)(1) applied, it made 
almost no express findings on the issue and did not address 
directly whether Denmark met the clearly improbable 
standard.  It stated only that it “believe[d] that there has been 
sufficient evidence by the [G]overnment to support the 
possession of firearms,” App. at 68, Hr’g Tr. 58:18–20, and 
adopted the presentence report “without change,” id. at 69, 
Hr’g Tr. 61:25–62:1.  Denmark now objects that this was error.  
Ordinarily we would remand, but here it is not necessary, for 
we can see nothing in the record to hint at dispelling the 
firearms-drug activity connection.  See United States v. Fishoff, 
949 F.3d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[I]t is evident from the 
[C]ourt’s . . . ruling that any further explanation on the part of 
the [C]ourt would not have changed the sentence it imposed.  
Thus[] any error is harmless.”). 
 
In determining whether it is clearly improbable that a 
weapon was connected with a drug offense, we look to four 
factors: “(1) the type of gun involved, with clear improbability 
less likely with handguns than with hunting rifles, (2) whether 
the gun was loaded, (3) whether [it] was stored near the drugs 
or drug paraphernalia, and (4) [] whether [it] was accessible.”  
Napolitan, 762 F.3d at 308 (quoting Drozdowski, 313 F.3d at 
822–23).   
 
Here, at least three of the four factors weigh against 




assault rifle, and a shotgun at his residence.  While the shotgun 
could have been a hunting rifle, the other two types of 
firearms—particularly the handguns—suggest that they were 
connected with Denmark’s drug activities rather than sporting 
or any other innocent use.  See Drozdowski, 313 F.3d at 822 
(agreeing with the Seventh Circuit that handguns are “tool[s] 
of the [drug] trade” because they are “easy to conceal yet 
deadly” (quoting United States v. Cantero, 995 F.2d 1407, 
1411 (7th Cir. 1993))).    
  
Second, law enforcement found one handgun with a 
loaded magazine in it (although no rounds were chambered).  
They also found several loaded magazines in the residence; at 
least some of the loaded magazines were recovered in the same 
bedroom as the guns.  This factor also weighs against 
Denmark. 
 
As for the third factor—whether the firearms were 
found near drugs or drug paraphernalia—the guns were all 
found in a second-story bedroom, whereas the drug 
paraphernalia were found in the garage and on the first floor.  
They were further away than the guns and drug paraphernalia 
in Drozdowski, which were all found in the same room.  313 
F.3d at 823.  But all the items here were in the same house 
where law enforcement observed Denmark making drug deals, 
and he has not argued that their precise location in the house 
demonstrates a lack of connection (for example, he does not 
argue that another resident had exclusive control over the parts 
of the house where the paraphernalia were stored).4  This 
factor, then, does not help Denmark.  
 
4 At sentencing, Denmark argued that he only used the 




Fourth and finally, the guns were sufficiently accessible 
to someone who already knew where they were located and 
had access to those locations.  See id.  In Drozdowski we agreed 
with the Sixth Circuit that a defendant’s guns were accessible 
when several were stored under furniture or in secret 
compartments and a handgun was stored in a safe in a bedroom.  
Id. at 824 (citing United States v. McGhee, 882 F.2d 1095, 
1099 (6th Cir. 1989)).  We adopted the Court’s reasoning that, 
although the guns were inaccessible to strangers, “they would 
be readily accessible to anyone who knew their location.”  Id. 
(quoting McGhee, 882 F.2d at 1099).  Here anyone who knew 
the guns were located in the safe and could open it would have 
been able to access them quickly.  And we note yet again that 
law enforcement observed Denmark make a drug deal over 
FaceTime in the same house where the guns were found just a 
month later.  This is strong evidence that Denmark had access 
to weapons during his drug-trafficking activities, and he has 
not produced any evidence to the contrary.  As we cannot say 
that they were “truly inaccessible,” see Drozdowski, 313 F.3d 




did not link his meth trafficking to the firearms.  But he offers 
no evidence of this.  The only evidence in the record is the 
Government’s, which indicates that the paraphernalia in 
Denmark’s house matched the packing materials in the meth 
he mailed.  Moreover, even if we eliminated this factor 
entirely, our conclusion would be the same.  The other three 
factors weigh heavily against Denmark, and the location at his 
home—even assuming there were no paraphernalia nearby—
does not itself establish clear improbability because of the 




* * * * * 
 
While the broad reach of the enhancement in 
§ 2D1.1(b)(1) may at times be concerning, it is not so here.  
Denmark had a small arsenal of weapons and ammunition in 
the same house where law enforcement observed him agreeing 
to provide several pounds of meth.  As he has neither credibly 
rebutted any of the Government’s evidence nor offered any 
plausible alternative explanation for why he possessed the 
weapons, we cannot say that the connection between the guns 
and the drugs was clearly improbable.  Thus we affirm the 
District Court’s application of the enhancement. 
